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COMMENT
ANTI-PORNOGRAPHY LEGISLATION AS
VIEWPOINT-DISCRIMINATION
GEOFFREY R. STONE*

The central principle of the First Amendment is that government may not excise specific viewpoints from public debate.'
This is so because government suppression of particular points
of view would effectively mutilate "the thinking process of the
community" and thus undermine core First Amendment values.2 A law, for example, prohibiting any person from criticizing the Social Security system or the draft would seriously
distort the search for truth, block meaningful self-governance,
and frustrate individual self-fulfillment.' Such viewpoint-based
restrictions are thus presumptively unconstitutional; they may
be upheld in only the most extraordinary of circumstances, if
4
ever.
In American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut,5 the United States

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held, and the
Supreme Court summarily affirmed, that the Indianapolis antipornography ordinance 6 violates the First Amendment. The
* Harry Kalven,Jr. Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I would like
to thank my colleagues Paul Bator, Mary Becker, Michael McConnell, Geoffrey Miller,
Stephen Schulhofer, David Strauss, and Cass Sunstein for their helpful comments on
an earlier draft of this article. I would also like to thank Enid Van Hoven for her research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3454
(1985); Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983); Perry Education
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 48-49 (1983). See generally Stone,
Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189 (1983).
2. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1960).
3. The literature on the values underlying the First Amendment is extensive. See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYsTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION (1970); A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note
2; F. Schauer, Free Speech: A PhilosophicalEnquiry (1982); Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 964 (1978); Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of
Expression, 1 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 204 (1972).
4. See generally Stone, supra note 1.
5. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) aff'dmem. 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986).
6. The Indianapolis ordinance provides that "pornography" means the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures or in words, that also includes one or more of the following:
(1) Women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation;
or

(2) Women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure
in being raped; or
(3) Women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated

HeinOnline -- 9 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 461 1986

462

HarvardJournalof Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 9

court of appeals reached this result on the ground that the ordinance expressly discriminated on the basis of viewpoint:
Under the ordinance graphic sexually explicit speech is
"pornography" or not depending on the perspective the author adopts. Speech that "subordinates" women and also,
for example, presents women as enjoying pain, humiliation,
or rape, or even simply presents women in "positions of servility or submission or display" is forbidden.... Speech that
portrays women in positions of equality is lawful, no matter
how graphic the sexual content. This is thought control. It
establishes an "approved" view of women, of how they react
to sexual encounters, of how the sexes may relate to each
other. Those who espouse the approved
view may use sexual
7
images; those who do not, may not.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the First Amendment for8
bids government to "ordain preferred viewpoints in this way."
In this article, I examine five arguments that might be made
against the court of appeals's conclusion that anti-pornography
leglislation embodies unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination: (1) Such legislation does not absolutely prohibit expression of the disfavored viewpoint, but limits its expression only
by means of graphic sexually explicit speech; (2) such legislation is not viewpoint-based; (3) such legislation does not pose
the dangers usually associated with viewpoint-based restrictions; (4) such legislation passes muster under even the most
stringent standards of viewpoint-based review; and (5) such
legislation restricts only "low" value speech, and thus should
not be tested by the stringent standards of viewpoint-based review. I reject each of these arguments and conclude that antior bruised or physically hurt, or as dismembered or truncated or fragmented
or severed into body parts; or
(4) Women are presented being penetrated by objects or animals; or
(5) Women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, abasement,
torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that
makes these conditions sexual;
(6) Women are presented as sexual objects for domination, conquest, violation, exploitation, possession or use, or through postures or positions of servility or submission or display.
See Indianapolis & Marion County, Ind., Ordinance 35, §§ 2 & 16-3(q) (June 15, 1984).
This article uses the phrase "obscenity" to refer.to those materials that meet the
Supreme Court's definition set forth in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). It
uses the phrase "pornography" to refer to those materials, described in the Indianapolis ordinance, that associate the physical abuse or degradation of women with sexual
pleasure. Although the concepts of "obscenity" and "pornography" overlap, they are
analytically and constitutionally distinct.
7. 771 F.2d at 328.
8. Id. at 325.
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is

unconstitutional

viewpoint-

Although anti-pornography legislation expressly discriminates on the basis of viewpoint, it does not ban all advocacy of
the view that women may be sexually aroused by pain, humiliation, or rape. Rather, it restricts expression of this view only by
means of graphic sexually explicit speech. Other means of expressing the disfavored point of view are unimpaired. Thus,
unlike a law prohibiting all advocacy of the view that women
may be sexually aroused by pain, humiliation, or rape, anti-pornography legislation is more modest in scope. One might
therefore argue that such legislation does not threaten the values underlying the First Amendment to the same degree as
more suppressive viewpoint-based restrictions, and that such
legislation should thus be tested by a less stringent standard of
review.
The Supreme Court has never accepted this argument. To
the contrary, the Court has consistently applied the stringent
standards of viewpoint-based review even to modest viewpointbased restrictions. In Schacht v. United States,9 for example, the
Court invalidated a federal statute prohibiting actors from
wearing the uniform of a branch of the armed forces of the
United States in a theatrical or motion-picture production if the
portrayal tended "to discredit that armed force." Although the
statute imposed only a modest restriction on the ability of individuals to oppose government policy, the Court held the statute unconstitutional because a law "which leaves Americans
free to praise the war in Vietnam but can send persons ...

to

prison for opposing it, cannot survive in a country which has
the First Amendment."1 0
The doctrine illustrated by Schact is not only settled, it is
sound. Three considerations combine both to explain and to
justify the doctrine." First, even if modest viewpoint-based restrictions do not skew public debate to the same degree as laws
9. 398 U.S. 58 (1970).
10. Id. at 63. See also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976):
Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
11. See Stone, supra note 1, at 200-33.
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that absolutely prohibit the advocacy of particular viewpoints,
they necessarily distort public debate to some degree. That is
in itself an important constitutional concern. But beyond this,
there is the further and perhaps more important fact that viewpoint-based restrictions cannot be neatly divided into those
that do and do not "seriously" distort public debate. The question is one of degree, and such a line would be extraordinarily
difficult to draw on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, an error in
line-drawing in this context could have extraordinarily serious
consequences for public debate. Thus, the safest and most sensible course is simply to test all viewpoint-based restrictions by
the same stringent standards of review."
Second, the Court has long recognized that government may
not restrict speech because it disapproves of a particular
message. In a democratic society, it is for the people and not
3
the government to decide what ideas are "good" or "bad.'
Government will rarely admit, however, that it is attempting to
restrict a particular viewpoint because it disagrees with the
ideas expressed. The problem is thus to ferret out such improper motivations when in fact they exist. The risk of improper motivation is especially high in the context of
viewpoint-based restrictions, for in considering the enactment
of such laws, government officials are especially likely to be affected, consciously or unconsciously, by their own sympathy or
hostility to the particular views sought to be restricted. In such
circumstances, the most sensible course is to presume improper motivation and to permit government to negate that
presumption by satisfying the stringent standards of viewpointbased review. 4
Third, even modest viewpoint-based restrictions are usually
designed to restrict speech because of its "communicative impact"-that is, because of "a fear of how people will react to
what the speaker is saying. '"15 This is important because governmental efforts to restrict speech because of its communicative impact usually rest upon constitutionally "disfavored"
12. See id. at.224-26.
13. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3454
(1985); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comni'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980):
United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Grcenburg Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 132

(1981).
14. See Stone, supra note 1, at 227-33.
15. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND) DISTRUST 11
TIONAL LAw 580 (1978).

(1980); see L. TIERn,

AMERICAN CONSTITtu-
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justifications. That is, such restrictions are typically defended
either on the ground that government does not trust its citizens
to make wise decisions if they are exposed to the expression, or
on the ground that the expression would offend others and
perhaps lead to a hostile audience response. Such paternalistic
or intolerance-based justifications for the suppression of particular viewpoints are incompatible with the basic premises of the
First Amendment. Laws that restrict speech for such reasons
are thus presumptively unconstitutional, whether or not they
significantly distort public debate.1 6
Anti-pornography legislation poses each of these concerns.
First, although such legislation limits communication of the
disfavored message only by means of graphic sexually explicit
speech, even the proponents of such legislation concede that
this is the most effective means of conveying the disfavored
point of view. Indeed, suppression of this means of expression
would significantly affect communication of the disfavored
message. That, after all, is what anti-pornography legislation is
all about. Second, it is highly likely that, in deciding to enact
such legislation, legislators will be affected not only by their
desire to prevent the harms associated with pornography, but
also by their understandable dislike for the message itself.
Would they be so quick to suppress speech for similar reasons
if they were sympathetic to the message restricted? Third, a primary concern underlying anti-pornography legislation is the
impact pornography has on its audience. This is, of course, a
concern with communicative impact based on the paternalistic
judgment that government does not trust its citizens to deal
with "dangerous" and "undesirable" ideas.
Consequently, although anti-pornography legislation does
not prohibit all advocacy of the view that women may be sexually aroused by pain, humiliation, or rape, and permits this view
to be expressed by means other than graphic sexually explicit
expression, this is not in itself sufficient justification to dilute
the standard of review. Anti-pornography legislation is indistinguishable in this respect from most other modest viewpointbased restrictions-no Nazi may march in Skokie; no Communist may teach in a public school; no person may criticize the
war to an audience that may contain soldiers. Any effort to di16. See Stone, supra note 1, at 215-17.
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lute the standard of review for anti-pornography legislation on
this basis would require a dramatic and unwarranted restructuring of First Amendment doctrine.
II
Although the court of appeals in Hudnut characterized antipornography legislation as viewpoint-based, one might argue
that such legislation should more appropriately be characterized as "harm-based."'
A harm-based statute defines the
speech to be restricted in terms of its capacity to cause specific,
identifiable harm. Laws that prohibit "any demonstration near
a hospital when the noise may disturb patients," or "any
speech that may trigger a hostile audience response," or "any
publication that may persuade listeners to refuse induction into
the army" are examples of harm-based statutes.
Some harm-based restrictions, illustrated by my hospital example, are content-neutral on their face and do not turn in application on the communicative impact of expression. Such
laws do not pose any greater risk of distortion, improper motivation, or disfavored justification than other content-neutral restrictions. They should be tested by the ordinary standards of
18
content-neutral review.
Other harm-based restrictions are more problematic. Consider, for example, my hostile audience illustration. Although
the hypothetical hostile audience statute does not expressly
single out a particular viewpoint for restriction, it turns in application on communicative impact, has distinct viewpoint-differential effects, is defended in terms of a constitutionally
disfavored intolerance-based justification, and raises serious
concerns about improper motivation.1 9 Thus, although such a
law may seem content-neutral on its face, it should be tested by
the standards of viewpoint-based review.2 ° Similarly, a law
17. Professor Cass Sunstein has offered this argument in conversation.
18. On content-neutral review, see generally L. TRIBE, supra note 15, at 682-700:
Stone, supra note 1, at 190-93.
19. The risk of improper motivation is enhanced in this situation because government officials know that in actual operation such restrictions will limit only some
messages-most likely those that are most offensive or controversial. Thus, official hostility to, or lack of sympathy for, the restricted speech is more likely in this context than
in the context of other, more conventional content-neutral restrictions.
20. See Stone, supra note 1,at 234-39. The Court has essentially adopted this position. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229 (1963); cf Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951). See also Ely, Flag Deserra-
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prohibiting any person from making a speech that might persuade others to commit unlawful acts should be deemed viewpoint-based, and tested by the standards of Brandenburg v.
Ohio,2 ' even though it may at first glance seem content-neutral
on its face.
Finally, there are those harm-based restrictions, like my draft
induction example, that are functionally indistinguishable from
expressly viewpoint-based restrictions. From a First Amendment standpoint, there is no relevant difference between a law
that prohibits criticism of the draft and a law that prohibits any
speech that may cause persons to refuse induction if the latter
is construed to prohibit any expression that criticizes the draft.
Although the harm-based statute is facially content-neutral, it
poses precisely the same dangers of distortion, improper motivation, and disfavored justification as the expressly viewpointbased statute.
Anti-pornography legislation is, at best, analogous to my last
illustration. That is, such legislation restricts expression that
causes a specific, narrowly defined harm because of its communicative impact. Like my draft induction example, anti-pornography legislation-even if labelled "harm-based"-poses
precisely the same dangers as an expressly viewpoint-based restriction. The problem, however, runs deeper. For even if the
hypothetical draft induction statute were constitutionally distinguishable from a law directed expressly at criticism of the
draft, that distinction would not save anti-pornography legislation. Anti-pornography legislation, unlike the examples examined above, is not viewpoint-neutral. Such legislation
prohibits, not sexually explicit expression that might cause certain harms, but sexually explicit expression that portrays women, for example, as sexual objects who may enjoy pain,
humiliation, or rape. Such legislation is thus expressly directed at
a particular viewpoint. It cannot be defended on the ground
that it is "merely" harm-based.
III
Although anti-pornography legislation is viewpoint-based on
lion: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorizationand Balancing in Fist,Aendment .4nalysis., 88
HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1500 (1975); Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First
Amendment, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 29, 53-54 (1973).
21. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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its face, one might argue that it should nonetheless be tested by
a less stringent standard of review because it does not pose the
dangers posed by other viewpoint-based restrictions. There are
two versions of this argument.
A
First, one might argue that the viewpoint-based character of
anti-pornography legislation does not reflect any governmental
hostility to the particular ideas restricted, but is simply a product of the fact that only the restricted ideas cause the relevant
harms. The argument runs as follows: Anti-pornography legislation is designed to restrict speech that may cause discrimination against women, sexual subordination, rape, and related
harms. In light of this purpose, it would make no sense to restrict speech that portrays women as equal or as victims of humiliation and pain, for such speech does not cause the relevant
harms. Anti-pornography legislation, in other words, is not underinclusive-it restricts all messages and only those messages
that cause the relevant harms.22 The viewpoint-based character
of the legislation thus derives not from any improper motivation, but from the very nature of the harms sought to be prevented. Accordingly, an important concern posed by other
viewpoint-based restrictions-the risk of improper motivation-is lacking in this context. A reduced standard ofjustification is therefore warranted.
This argument is unpersuasive. Although underinclusiveness
dramatizes the risk of improper motivation by highlighting a
potential inequality in the drafting of the legislation,23 the risk
of improper motivation is by no means limited to underinclusive laws. Indeed, the risk is present in all viewpoint-based restrictions. Consider, for example, a law prohibiting any person
from criticizing the war to an audience that may contain
soldiers. As in the anti-pornography context, defenders of this
law might argue that the restriction is viewpoint-based not be22. Under this argument, anti-pornography legislation is not underinclusive in terms
of the viewpoints restricted. It is underinclusive, however, insofar as it restricts expression of the disfavored view only through graphic sexually explicit speech. But that is a
different problem, which poses questions of "means" rather than viewpoint
discrimination.
23. For examples of cases focusing on underinclusiveness. see, eg.. Erznoznik v. City
ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972). See generally Karst, Equality as a CentralPrinciplein the Fiist Amendment, 43 U. Cii.
L. REv. 20 (1975).
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cause legislators oppose criticism of the war, but because the
restricted views are the only ones that cause the relevant
harms-refusal of duty and insubordination. It seems clear,
however, that the decision of legislators to enact the legislation
may well have been affected not only by their concern about
refusal of duty and insubordination, but also by their hostility
to criticism of the war generally. In such circumstances, we test
the claim of good motives not by accepting the protestation of
innocence, but by demanding a showing of harm that convinces
us that the legislators would have adopted the law even if they
had stronglyfavored the restricted views. 2 4 Similarly, in the antipornography context, the decision to adopt anti-pornography
legislation may well be affected not only by a desire to prevent
discrimination against women, sexual subordination, And rape,
but also by the legislators' hostility to the view that women are
unequal and that they may derive sexual satisfaction from humiliation, pain, or even rape. As in the criticism of the war illustration, we test this proposition by the ordinary standards of
viewpoint-based review.
B
The second argument for the proposition that anti-pornography legislation does not pose the same dangers as other viewpoint-based restrictions focuses on the "coercion" justification
for the legislation. Proponents of anti-pornography legislation
maintain that women are coerced into performing in pornographic works and that suppression of such works is necessary
to remove the incentive for such coercion.2 5 This justification
for the legislation does not turn on the communicative impact
of expression and thus does not rest on a constitutionally disfavored justification.- ' That is, the coercion justification rests
neither on government's paternalistic judgment that it cannot
trust its citizens to make wise decisions if they are allowed to
receive the message,2 7 nor on government's concern that the
24. See Clark, Legislative Motivation and FundamentalRights in ConstitutionalLaw, 15 SAN
DIEGo L. REV. 953, 990-96 (1978); See also Stone, supra note 1, at 227-233.
25. SeeJacobs, Pattents of Violence: A Feminist Pespective on the Regulation of Pornography,
7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 5, 20 (1984).
26. For discussion of the relationship between communicative impact and constitutionally disfavored justifications, see Stone, supra note 1, at 207-17.
27. It is premised on a paternalistic judgment about the women participants, however. See Branit, Reconciling Free Speech and Equaliy: ll'hatJustifles Censorship, 9 HARV. J. L.
& PUB. POL. 428, 451-55 (1986).
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ideas expressed may offend others or trigger a hostile audience
response. Rather, it rests on government's constitutionally less
problematic interest in protecting the health and safety of the
participants themselves. Accordingly, such legislation can be
defended in a way that eliminates one of the three primary dangers of viewpoint-based restrictions.
The Court has never regarded the absence of a constitutionally disfavored justification as sufficient reason in itself, however, to justify a dilution of the standard of review for expressly
viewpoint-based restrictions. To the contrary, the Court in
such circumstances routinely applies the stringent standards of
viewpoint-based review despite the absence of a constitutionally disfavored justification. s Suppose, for example, a city
prohibits all anti-war demonstrations because anti-war demonstrators have tended to be unruly in past demonstrations.
Although this law does not rest on either a paternalistic or intolerance-based justification, and does not turn on the communicative impact of expression, the Court would surely test it by
the most stringent standards of viewpoint-based review. Even
in the absence of a constitutionally disfavored justification, the
law poses the two other dangers of viewpoint-based restrictions-it expressly distorts public debate in a viewpoint-based
manner and poses a significant risk that it was enacted in part
because of a legislative hostility to anti-war protests. Anti-pornography legislation is governed by the same principle.2 9
28. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); City of MadisonJoint School Dist.
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976); Police Dep't of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
29. A related argument for the proposition that anti-pornography legislation does
not rest on a constitutionally disfavored justification turns on the notion that paternalistic justifications for restrictions on expression are constitutionally disfavored only
when government attempts to suppress a viewpoint because of its concern that individuals exposed to that viewpoint may make unwise decisions in the political proress. In the
pornography context, the paternalistic justification is not directed at political judgments. Rather, the concern is that individuals exposed to pornography may behave
"badly" in other ways-they may discriminate, subordinate, and rape.
This argument defines the concern about paternalism too narrowly. The First
Amendment is concerned with personal autonomy and individual decisionmaking not
only in the political context, but in the social, personal, and economic realms as well.
To prevent individuals from learning of ideas or information because government does
not trust them to make wise personal, social, or economic decisions is also constitutionally disfavored. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. ol'
N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
It might be argued further, however, that concerns about impermissible paternalism
make little sense when, as in the pornography context, the government restricts speech
because it may lead persons to commit oiminalacts, such as rape. If government's deci-
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This is not to suggest that the presence or absence of a constitutionally disfavored justification is constitutionally irrelevant. To the contrary, this factor may play an important role in
deciding how to analyze a law that is not viewpoint-based on its
face. For example, the Court has considered the presence or
absence of constitutionally disfavored justifications a significant
factor in deciding on the appropriate standard of review for
both content-neutral30 and subject-matter restrictions. 3 1 But
when a law is expressly viewpoint-based on its face, the absence
of a constitutionally disfavored justification will not save it.
It may be useful in this respect to contrast anti-pornography
legislation with the child pornography legislation upheld in
New York v. Ferber.3 2 In Ferber, the Court upheld a state law
prohibiting the distribution of material depicting a "sexual performance" by a child. The purpose of the law was to prevent
the sexual exploitation and abuse of minors who participate in
such performances. Thus, like the purpose of preventing the
sexual exploitation and abuse of women performers in the pornography context, the government's purpose in Ferber was unrelated to either of the constitutionally disfavored justifications
for restricting free expression. A critical factor in Ferber, howsion to prohibit rape itself is not impermissibly paternalistic, why is its decision to restrict speech that may induce individuals to commit rape not also valid? There are
several answers to this question. First, although government may declare it unlawful
for individuals to engage in certain types of conduct, it does not necessarily follow that
government may also prohibit individuals from obtaining the information necessary for
them to make independent and autonomous decisions whether to obey the law. See
Scanlon, supra note 3. Second, for government to prohibit expression because others
may engage in unlawful conduct is incompatible with the principle that government
may restrict expression because of the way others may react to the speaker's message
only if the speaker expressly advocates and specifically intends to cause the unlawful
acts. If the speaker does not expressly advocate and specifically intend to cause the
unlawful acts, the government should direct its enforcement efforts at the actors alone.
Cf Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Third, even if paternalism is not constitutionally disfavored in this context, the very existence of this justification for restricting speech heightens the risk of improper motivation, for government's hostility to the
consequences of an idea increases the probability that government disapproves of the
idea itself.
In any event, this argument, like the argument addressed in the text, overstates the
importance of the absence of a constitutionally disfavored justification when a law is
expressly viewpoint-based on its face. In such circumstances, the presence of the other
two concerns-distortion of public debate and improper motivation-are independently sufficient to trigger viewpoint-based review.
30. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); see Stone, supra note 1, at
234-39.
31. See, e.g., City ofRenton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); see Stone, supra note 1,
at 239-42.
32. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
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ever, was the viewpoint-neutrality of the restriction. As the
Court observed, the child pornography legislation raised "no
question ... of censoring a particular literary theme. ' 33 "Sexual performances" involving children were prohibited regardless of the particular messages conveyed. Anti-pornography
legislation, however, is expressly viewpoint-based. Ferber, therefore, offers no answer to the viewpoint discrimination objection
to anti-pornography legislation.3 4
In any event, there is a further difficulty with the coercion
justification, for anti-pornography legislation is obviously underinclusive insofar as it is designed to deal with this problem.
The risk that women performers will be coerced or exploited in
the production of graphic sexually explicit speech is wholly unrelated to the particular viewpoint expressed. The coercion rationale thus provides no justification for the viewpoint-based
discrimination.
IV
Although anti-pornography legislation is viewpoint-based on
its face, one might argue that it is nonetheless constitutional
because it satisfies even the stringent standards of viewpointbased review. Three harms are usually associated with pornography: (a) Its production involves the coercion and exploitation
of women performers; (b) it perpetuates the social and economic subordination of women; and (c) it causes rape and
other sexual abuse of women.3 5 There can be little doubt that,
to at least some extent, pornography generates these harms.
The question is whether this is sufficient justification for the
legislation.
Government has a compelling interest in preventing the coercion and exploitation of women who perform in pornographic works. For two rather obvious reasons, however, this is
33. 458 U.S. at 763.

34. There are at least two further distinctions between anti-pornography legislation
and the child pornography legislation upheld in Ferber. First, the Court held in Ferber
that a prohibition on the use of children in "sexual performances" had only a "de
minimis" effect on free expression and that the legislation thus restricted only low value
speech. 458 U.S. at 762. A similar claim cannot be made about anti-pornography legislation. See text accompanying notes 57-60. Second, the government's interest in
preventing adult women from consenting to perform in sexually explicit works in order
to protect them from exploitation and abuse is highly paternalistic and not of the same
order as its interest in protecting children. See Branit, supra note 27, at 452-53.
35. See Branit, supra note 27, and authorities cited therein.
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not a constitutionally sufficient justification for anti-pornography legislation. First, as noted earlier, such legislation is underinclusive in a viewpoint-based manner with respect to this
interest. There is no good reason to protect only those women
who perform in works that espouse the disfavored point of
view. A law directed at this concern should, at the very least, be
viewpoint-neutral. Second, the legislation is overinclusive with
respect to this interest. Although some women may be coerced
into perfoming in such works, there is no constitutionally sufficient basis to presume conclusively that all women who perform in such works are coerced and exploited. The general
First Amendment requirement that government adopt "the
least restrictive means" of achieving its ends clearly disposes of
the coercion rationale.3 6
Government also has a compelling interest in preventing discrimination against women. As the Court has observed, legislation prohibiting such discrimination "plainly serves compelling
interests of the highest order.""7 In Roberts v. United States
Jaycees,38 the Court held that, in light of this interest, Minnesota
could constitutionally prohibit the Jaycees from discriminating
against women, despite the Jaycees' claim that the challenged
law infringed their First Amendment freedom of association. It
is useful to contrast the legislation upheld in Roberts with antipornography legislation.
The legislation upheld in Roberts declared it unlawful to deny
any person "the full and equal enjoyment" of any "place of
public accomodation because of ... sex." In upholding this
legislation, the Court emphasized that the statute did "not aim
at the suppression of speech," did "not distinguish between
prohibited and permitted activity on the basis of viewpoint,"3 9
and was directed at "activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact." 40 The legislation upheld in Roberts, in other words, posed much less of a danger to
free expression than a viewpoint-based restriction on speech.
Because it was not directed at speech, there was no significant
36. See Branit, supra note 27, at 451. On "least restrictive means" analysis, see, for
example, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958).
37. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 3253 (1984).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 3255.
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danger of improper motivation or distortion of public debate. 4 1
Because the harm at which the law was directed was unrelated
to communicative impact, the law was not defended in terms of
any constitutionally disfavored justification. Thus, although the
interest in preventing discrimination against women provides
sufficient justification for government to prohibit the Jaycees
from discriminating against women, it surely would not justify a
law prohibiting theJaycees from advocating the legalization or
desirability of such discrimination. This distinction-between
laws that are viewpoint-neutral and have only an incidental effect on free expression, and laws that are expressly viewpointbased and are designed to restrict free expression-is central
to the First Amendment. It explains why it is permissible for
government to prohibit acts of gender discrimination, even
when the prohibition has an incidental effect on speech, but
impermissible for government to prohibit speech that supports
the view that such discrimination is desirable.4 2
In Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,4" the Court declared
that "above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."4 4
Although this declaration has proved somewhat overstated
with respect to subject-matter restrictions4" and laws directed
41. Even content-neutral laws can have unintended distorting effects. In Roberts, for
example, the prohibition on sex discrimination might disadvantage organizations that
use such discrimination as a means of symbolic expression more than it disadvantages
other organizations. Such indirect and unintended distorting effects are not analogous,
however, to the distorting effects of expressly viewpoint-based restrictions. See Stone,
supra note 1, at 217-27.
42. A similar point might be made with respect to the distinction between laws
prohibiting adultery and laws prohibiting expression that portrays adultery as desirable. In Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684
(1959), for example, the Court overturned a New York statute that required the denial
of a license to exhibit any motion picture that presented adultery "as being right and
desirable." The Court explained that by preventing "the exhibition of a motion picture
because that picture advocates an idea, [New York) has thus struck at the very heart of
constitutionally protected liberty." Id. at 688. The First Amendment's "guarantee is
not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority."
Id. at 689. Moreover, the Court declared that even where, as in Kingsley, the speech
advocated "conduct proscribed by law" and the restriction was limited to a single medium of expression, the speech could not constitutionally be suppressed "'where the
advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy
would be immediately acted on.'" Id. (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
376 (1927) (Brandeis, J. concurring)).
43. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
44. Id. at 95.
45. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); see Stone, supra
note I, at 239-42.
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at "low" value speech,4 6 it remains stunningly true with respect
to viewpoint-based restrictions on "high" value expression.
The Court has not upheld a viewpoint-based restriction in the
realm of "high" value speech for more than thirty years,4 7 and
although the Court has never expressly held that such restrictions are per se unconstitutional, one might fairly read that lesson into the actual record of the Court's decisions. But even if
that lesson is overdrawn, it is clear that viewpoint-based restrictions on high value speech are permissible in only the most extraordinary of circumstances.
Moreover, even if viewpoint-based restrictions are permissible if the restricted speech creates a clear-and-present danger,
anti-pornography legislation cannot meet that standard.
Whatever the connection between pornography and its harms,
there is no plausible danger that each exhibition of pornography is likely to cause an immediate act of discrimination, sexual
abuse or rape. This is not to say that such speech never contributes to these harms. A causative correlation may well exist. But
the sort of remote and attenuated correlation that may exist in
this context has never been thought sufficient to satisfy the
modern version of clear-and-present danger.
One might argue, of course, that it makes no sense to prohibit the suppression of pornography in the absence of proof
that each exhibition creates a clear and present danger of harm.
One might argue that such speech should be suppresed so long
as at least some exhibitions of pornography will eventually cause
harm. Why should it matter that the danger is not "clear" and
"present" with respect to each particular exhibition, so long as
the speech as a class is harmful?
These questions raise fundamental issues about the structure
and theory of First Amendment doctrine. They call to mind the
historical "bad tendency" test and Dean Wigmore's complaint
that Justice Holmes's articulation of the modern version of
clear-and-present danger in his dissenting opinion in Abrams v.
United States4 8 failed to consider the potential cumulative effect
of many individually harmless speakers.4 9 These issues have
46. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
47. See Stone, supra note 1, at 197.
48. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
49. Wigmore, Abrams v. United States: Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Thnggeny in WnTime and Peace-Time, 14 ILL. L. REV. 359, 550 (1920).
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been resolved, however.
There are at least five compelling reasons for rejecting the
argument that the correlation between speech and harm that
may exist in the pornography context is sufficient to justify a
viewpoint-based restriction.
(1) The argument that speech may be restricted if it causes
harm assumes that the harm is more important than the
speech. As we have seen, however, viewpoint-based restrictions
pose an especially serious threat to the system of free expression. Only an extraordinary threat of harm is sufficient to support such restrictions.
(2) By insisting that the proponents of viewpoint-based restrictions demonstrate that each particular act of speech is
likely to produce an imminent harm, the clear-and-present danger test makes more difficult the general suppression of particular points of view.
(3) By insisting on imminence, the clear-and-present danger
test holds the speaker responsible for the acts of others only
when the speaker can fairly be said to have "caused" those acts
by his expression.
(4) By insisting on imminence, the clear-and-present danger
test reduces the difficulty of predicting causation and thus
reduces the probability that improper motivations will lead legislators to exaggerate the potential harm.
(5) The clear-and-present danger test compels government
to attempt to achieve its objectives by means other than the
suppresion of speech. It requires government to prove that
suppression is essential if it is effectively to achieve its ends. It
thus permits government to restrict speech only as a last resort
when all other means of dealing with the problem have failed.5"
V
Finally, one might argue that the ordinary standards of viewpoint-based review are inapplicable to anti-pornography legislation because pornographic expression is of only "low" First
Amendment value. Pornography does not fall within any of the
50. By insisting on imminence, for example,
adopts the assumption that "unless the incidence
nent that it may befall before there is opportunity
be applied is more speech, not enforced silence."
377 (1927) (Brandeis J., concurring).

the clear-and-present danger test
of the evil apprehended is so immifor full discussion," the "remedy to
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
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5
established categories of low value speech: it is not obscenity, '
52
5
3
5
incitement, false statement of fact, child pornography, 4
fighting words, or commercial advertising.5 6 The question,
then, is whether pornography constitutes a new category of low
value expression.
There are at least two interesting arguments one might make
along these lines. First, one might argue that pornographic expression has an insidious, almost subliminal, effect on its audience. Such expression arguably alters values, assumptions, and
expectations not by logic, reason, or persuasion, but by indirection. It works at the unconscious rather than the conscious
level. Moreover, such expression arguably affects the reader or
viewer in a manner akin to behavior modification-exposure to
the idea that women are unequal or may derive sexual satisfaction from pain, humiliation, or rape is accompanied by sexual
arousal, thus making it more difficult for the reader or viewer
to resist the idea, for it is unconsciously associated with strong
positive reinforcement.
One might argue that expression that influences individuals
in this manner is not entitled to full First Amendment protection, for such expression arguably undermines individual autonomy, distorts rather than enhances public debate, and
cannot meaningfully be answered by effective "counterspeech."5 7 This argument is not without force. But it proves
51. Although anti-pornography legislation is directed against expression dealing
with sex, it is not limited to obscenity. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); see
also Branit, supra note 27, at 438.
52. Although anti-pornography legislation is directed in part against the unlawful
acts that pornography may "cause," it is not limited to express advocacy of imminent and
unlawful conduct. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); see also Note, AntiPornography Laws and First Amendment Vahes, 98 HARV. L. REV. 460, 463-65 (1984).
53. Although critics of pornography suggest that such expression communicates a
"false" message that all women enjoy humiliation and rape, pornography cannot reasonably be said to communicate a false statement of fact. On false statements of fact as
low value speech, see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 240 (1974). Although
the concept of group libel offers a somewhat closer analogy, see Note, supra note 52, at
467-69, the doctrine of group libel, first recognized in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250 (1952), seems to have no present vitality. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).
54. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1983).
55. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
56. Although pornography may, like many other forms of expression, have a commercial motivation, this has never been thought sufficient to bring expression within
the concept of commercial speech. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod's Corp., 463 U.S.
60 (1983).
57. See Note, supra note 52, at 471-72; see also Scanlon, Freedom ofExpression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. Prrr. L. REV. 519, 546-48 (1979).
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too much. There are no doubt some forms of expression that
operate in an unconscious, deceptive manner that government
may constitutionally regulate or even prohibit. For example,
government could surely ban subliminal advertising, in which
commercial or political messages are flashed on the television
or movie screen so quickly that they are discerned only by the
unconsious mind. Such a ban could be accomplished in a content-neutral manner, without focusing in any way on the particular viewpoints involved. Once one moves beyond this,
however, government efforts to regulate or prohibit other
forms of emotional or non-rational appeals, especially when
tied to particular viewpoints, run head-on into the First
Amendment. As the court of appeals recognized in Hudnut, "racial bigotry, anti-semitism, violence on television, reporters' biases-these and many more influence the culture and shape
our socialization .... Yet all is protected as speech, however
insidious. Any other answer leaves the government in control
of all the institutions of culture ...."I8 In other words, it is too
easy to characterize "undesirable" ideas as insidious. The concept is too open-ended, too subject to manipulation to justify
viewpoint-based discrimination.
Second, analogizing to obscenity, one might argue that pornography is of low First Amendment value because it (1) appeals primarily to the prurient interest in sex, and thus is not
"speech" in the constitutional sense, 9 and (2) is without serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.60 Under this
view, pornography is of low First Amendment value for essentially the same reason obscenity is of low value, but is restricted
not because it offends standards of decency, but because of the
harms it causes to women. 6 Although there may be merit in
this approach, particularly insofar as it might ultimately redefine the obscenity doctrine, it would not save existing anti-pornography legislation. To the contrary, this approach would
require the re-drafting of anti-pornography legislation to incorporate the prurient interest and "no serious value" elements.
58. 771 F.2d at 330.
59. Just as touching a person's thigh is arguably not "speech" within the meaning of
the First Amendment, expression that has primarily the same purpose and effect as
touching a person's thigh is arguably not "speech" within the meaning of that amendment. See Schauer, Speech and "Speech -- Obscenitv and "Obscenity": An Exercise in the Interpretation of ConstitutionalLanguage, 67 GEO. L.J. 899, 922-26 (i 979).
60. See Note, supra note 52, at 473-74.
61. See Sunstein, Ponography and the First Amendment, 1986 DtixE L.J. (forthcoming).
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Such re-drafting might save the legislation, but at the cost of
significantly narrowing its scope.
There is, in any event, a further difficulty with the low value
defense of anti-pornography legislation. For even if pornography falls within some category of low value expression, it is not
at all clear that government can constitutionally enact viewpoint-based restrictions within the context of low value speech.
False statements of fact have only low First Amendment value,
but could government constitutionally prohibit only false statements of fact that criticize the conduct of a war? Obscenity is of
low First Amendment value, but could government constitutionally prohibit obscene expression only if it advocated
"loose" morals? Express incitement is of low First Amendment
value, but could government prohibit express incitement of vi-

olence only by those who criticize the government?
In other words, even within the realm of low value speech,
government may not adopt viewpoint-based restrictions without meeting the standards of viewpoint-based review. This is
not surprising, for the special dangers of viewpoint-based restrictions-distortion of public debate, improper motivation,
and reliance on constitutionally disfavored justifications-are
present in the low value realm to precisely the same extent that
they are present in the realm of high value speech. Moreover,
when we say that speech is of low First Amendment value, we
mean, at most, that it is not "speech" within the meaning of the
First Amendment. But the First Amendment prohibits viewpoint-based discrimination even in the regulation of conduct
that has nothing to do with free speech. Consider, for example,
a state law that punishes assassination more severely if it is
committed by opponents of the war. For the same reason that
such a statute constitutes unconstitutional viewpoint-discrimination, it is unconstitutional for government to restrict pornography in a viewpoint-based manner, even if pornography is
only low value expression. The low value characterization, in
other words, does not legitimate an otherwise unconstitutional
viewpoint-based restriction.
VI
The harms associated with pornography cannot be easily dismissed. But the harms associated with anti-pornography legislation are serious as well. Such legislation undermines our
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commitment to viewpoint-neutrality and thus strikes at the very
core of our First Amendment jurisprudence. Government cannot suppress graphic sexually explicit expression because it
portrays women as sexual objects who enjoy humiliation and
rape without opening the door to other forms of viewpointbased suppression. If viewpoint-based restrictions are permissible in this context, there is no principled basis for distinguishing other speech that may also have harmful effects. This is a
door best left closed.
This is not to say that society should ignore the harms of
pornography. To the contrary, we should vigorously pursue
other, less constitutionally problematic, means of addressing
these harms. The coercion and exploitation of performers
should be prohibited. Laws prohibiting rape, sexual abuse, and
discrimination should be strengthened and rigorously enforced. And, perhaps most important, the issue of pornography
should remain a central topic of public discussion and debate.
Our acceptance of racist expression has changed radically in
recent years without the aid of government suppression. Individuals who once found the characterizations in "Amos and
Andy" amusing would now be shocked to see their children
amused by such fare. A similar change is possible with respect
to pornography. As we become more sensitive to the actual
message of such expression and to the harms it may inflict, we
may eventually come to regard Playboy as as embarrassing and
as inappropriate as we now regard "Amos and Andy." It is
through education and "raising of consciousness," rather than
censorship, that such change will come about.
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